The U.S. and South Korea are once again publicly considering deploying a small number of U.S. air-delivered nuclear bombs (non-strategic tactical nukes) on South Korean territory. Advocates contend that forward-deploying low-yield tactical nuclear gravity bombs to U.S. airbases within South Korea will strengthen nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.

Nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia is threatened. Over the last two years, China’s diplomatic relations with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have deteriorated. Four years ago, North Korea began a new round of nuclear threats against South Korea. Tokyo, Honolulu, and Los Angeles are on Pyongyang’s public target list. Earlier this year, Western government sources confirmed that North Korea has a ballistic missile base near China, and several of the missiles may have intercontinental range. There are indications North Korea is also building more sophisticated nuclear weapons, possibly with Russian assistance.

The U.S. had tactical nukes in South Korea from the late 1950s until the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, Washington began reducing the number of nuclear weapons stored or deployed on the ground elsewhere in Asia. Some very vocal strategists argued that forward-deployed American nukes in South Korea were simply too vulnerable to destruction by conventional air and missile attacks, much less a nuclear strike. The Pentagon concluded the U.S. could provide nuclear deterrence with naval forces and strategic air power (with Guam as a key forward base). To be frank, many of the U.S. nukes withdrawn from Asia were deemed obsolete (Cold War relic tube artillery-delivered nuclear shells and aerial bombs).

But time marches on. The U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing currently has 500 nuclear warheads and plans to double that figure to 1,000 warheads in the next five years.

China’s nuclear weapons buildup, its expanded naval capabilities, and its new mid-range and hypersonic missiles have changed Seoul’s and Washington’s assessments about nukes on the Korean Peninsula.

Nuclear weapons proliferation is another consideration in Washington—proliferation by frightened allies. If high-tech and wealthy South Korea and Japan conclude the U.S. nuclear umbrella is unreliable—i.e., the U.S. won’t risk nuclear war with China should North Korea or China attack either of them—both nations can develop their own nuclear weapons. And they will build them quickly. In 2023, South Korea’s then-president (Yoon Suk-yeol) raised the possibility of building its own nuclear weapons, and Korean media reported it.

Washington insists its commitment to defend South Korea and Japan is firm and absolute. Additionally, there are human tripwires on the ground. The U.S. still has around 28,000 military personnel stationed in South Korea—primarily U.S. Army ground forces and USAF personnel. (AB)