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October 12, 2025: The analysis in the How Russia Fights project began when General Christopher Cavoli, commander of U.S. Army operations in Europe and Africa, realized something critical. U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) assigned to the European theater lacked a detailed understanding of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) and were unable to adequately advise him and other senior officers. Between 1991 and 2014, the United States considered Russia a strategic partner. As a result, FAO training shifted its focus away from Russian military capabilities to areas like China and the Pacific. To address this training gap, Cavoli assembled a team of retired Russian-speaking Army FAOs. These men had more than 200 years of combined experience working on aspects of the Russian military and its operations. This group called themselves the Troika, the Russian word for three. The Troika was tasked with creating a training course for FAOs focused on the RAF at the operational and tactical levels. This course became the foundation for the project.
After a successful pilot course in 2021, Cavoli directed the Troika to create a one-day version of the Russian Way of War (RWOW) for senior leaders. A week-long version was developed for staff officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civilians. When Russia launched its Special Military Operation (SMO) against Ukraine in early 2022, the Troika observed closely. They had just completed the primary course, in which FAO students planned a hypothetical Russian invasion of Ukraine as part of the curriculum. The curriculum was based on Russian tactical doctrine, theory, professional military journals, exercises, and case studies of recent Russian operations in Chechnya, Ukraine, and Syria. The Troika wanted to see how well their curriculum held up in a real Russian large-scale combat operation. It held up well, and many Troika assumptions proved accurate. However, there were some surprises and a few overlooked items. The Troika began updating the curriculum in real time. On the second day of the SMO, the Troika consolidated and organized 24 hours of hasty analysis.
Before the Troika came along, the Russian military was struggling to maintain its strength. During the two decades before the Ukraine War, there was increasing popular opposition to military service. This made it difficult to recruit enough personnel, let alone competent ones, and troop quality sharply declined. Draft dodging reached epidemic proportions, and efforts to attract well-paid volunteers failed. Thirteen years ago, the military had 220,000 officers and 200,000 contract personnel. These were well-paid volunteers encouraged to become non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or sergeants. Most troops were conscripts, and it was increasingly difficult to find men willing to become well-paid contract soldiers and eventually sergeants. Many of the missing troops were young men who were conscripted but never showed up. The barracks were thinly populated, and the situation became a national scandal.
Russia's military leaders came to understand that the key problem was the lack of adequate troop supervision. In other words, Russia had too few NCOs and even fewer competent ones. During the Soviet Union period (1921–1991), the communists assigned NCO responsibilities to junior officers, whom they considered more trustworthy. However, this plan had a major flaw. Without NCOs, no one maintained order and discipline in the barracks. The young lieutenants assigned to lead platoons lacked experience in handling troops and were often intimidated by bullies in the ranks. There were not enough experienced, higher-ranking officers to support the lieutenants. While the threat of arrest and prison or labor camps prevented mutiny or complete anarchy, serious problems persisted. Stronger troops bullied weaker ones, making military service extremely unpopular for all the wrong reasons. Conscripts did not mind serving their country, but they resented the harsh conditions.
For over a decade, the generals have tried to break the cycle of hazing. Taking advice from their Western counterparts, they sought to develop NCOs who could take charge of the barracks. They discovered that building an effective NCO corps from scratch is not easy. The culture of hazing proved difficult to eradicate. Many of the first professional Russian NCOs gave up and left the military. Facing down gangs of bullies was more trouble than it was worth.
The Russians could not afford to stop trying, as without a solution to the bullying, they were left with a less effective military. They proposed increasing the number of contract troops to 425,000 over four years and using a six-week training and selection program to ensure the right candidates were selected for NCO training. The six-week course consisted of training and testing sessions to determine if candidates could handle the stress of military life and had the maturity to avoid hazing and stop others from bullying soldiers. These new contract soldiers were expected to pursue a military career and take on responsibilities such as becoming NCOs or technical specialists. To meet the goal of 425,000 contract soldiers, the military needed to recruit 50,000 new contract soldiers annually. If achieved, this would mean most enlisted troops would be contract soldiers and professionals.
Conscripts are currently inducted twice a year, in April and October. Last year, the April intake was 220,000, but fewer than that actually served. In October, only 135,000 were expected, and about 100,000 were actually enlisted. The military has accepted that it will not obtain more than 270,000 conscripts annually, if that. This means a million-man force is unattainable. Currently, there are too many casualties, too few officers, insufficient contract soldiers and NCOs, and barely enough conscripts, assuming conscription goals are met, which seems unrealistic.
The basic recruiting problem is twofold. First, military service is highly unpopular, and potential conscripts are increasingly successful at dodging the draft. The biggest issue, however, is the rapidly declining number of 18-year-olds each year. The latest crop of draftees was born after the Soviet Union dissolved, when the birth rate plummeted, not because the Soviet Union was gone, but due to the economic collapse caused by decades of communist mismanagement that precipitated the fall of the communist government. The number of available draftees dropped from 1.5 million annually in the early 1990s to 800,000 today. Fewer than half of those potential conscripts show up, and many have criminal records or tendencies that perpetuate the abuse of new recruits, making military service highly undesirable.
With conscripts now serving only one year instead of two, the military is forced to accept many marginal recruits—sickly, overweight, or with bad attitudes or drug issues—to maintain the strength of military and Ministry of Interior units. Even elite airborne and commando units rely heavily on conscripts. Most of these young men take a year to master the necessary skills, only to be discharged shortly after. Few choose to remain in uniform and pursue a military career, primarily because the Russian military is seen as a dysfunctional institution unlikely to improve soon. With so many troops now being one-year conscripts and too few contract soldiers surviving their first year, the best officers and NCOs grow frustrated with managing alcoholics, drug users, and petty criminals taken in to meet quotas. This leads to an exodus of capable leaders, leaving the Russian military with increasingly poorly trained and unreliable conscripts.
The government found that, even among contract soldiers, old abuses persisted, and most of the best contract soldiers left when their contracts expired due to the brutality and lack of discipline in the barracks. Hazing is most frequently committed by troops who have served for about six months against new recruits. This extends to a pattern of abuse and brutality by all senior enlisted troops against junior ones, which has long been out of control. The abuse continues to increase due to growing animosity toward troops who are not ethnic Russians.
Conscription and the prospect of hazing led to a massive increase in draft dodging. Bribes and document fraud are commonly used, and neither parents nor potential conscripts consider this a crime. Avoiding the draft is seen as a form of self-preservation.
The Russian lack of sergeants, or praporshchiki, was difficult to address. Simply promoting more troops to that rank, paying them more, and ordering them to take charge did not work. Looking to Western armies, the Russians noted that those forces provided extensive professional training for new NCOs, with additional training as they advanced in rank. However, this is a long-term process, and benefits will take years to materialize.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, it had five million troops in its armed forces. By the early 21st century, Russia’s military was reduced to less than one million, despite retaining most of the Soviet Union’s territory but only half its population. Although the Russian armed forces lost over 80 percent of their strength between 1991 and 2008, a disproportionate number of officers remained. At the start of post-Soviet reforms, the Russian military had about 1.2 million personnel, with 400,000 in the army and the rest in paramilitary units, many of which were uniformed and armed like soldiers. However, there were 355,000 officers in this force—more than one in three. Additionally, some 40,000 officer positions remained vacant. The reorganization eliminated nearly half of these positions.
Russia has tried to change public attitudes toward the armed forces by publicizing new changes and programs. However, word spread that most of these efforts failed, largely due to the Internet. Polls consistently show that most military-age men do not want to serve, primarily due to hazing and prison-like conditions in the barracks. The new generation of NCOs and improved troop living conditions are intended to create an environment that does not deter conscripts and volunteers.
Virtually every reform effort has failed, which explains the often ineffective performance of Russian officers and troops in Ukraine.
The full report can be downloaded at How Russia Fights: A Compendium of Troika Observations on Russia’s Special Military Operations.