Che in Bolivia

Part of Helion’s ‘Latin America at War’ series, Che Guevara’s Final Adventure follows the final months of the famous Argentinian-Cuban Revolutionary in his failed and fatal attempt to spark a Communist Revolution in the Bolivian Amazon.

Per previous glossy books published by Helion, the author, Sapienza, sets up the political-military history of the Bolivian nation which gave Guevara the idea that a Communist uprising could successfully overthrow the pro-American government of President Victor Paz Estenssoro. Sapienza then proceeds to sketch out the small guerilla force Che infiltrated Bolivia with and the Bolivian Armed Forces which opposed him. A very complete analysis of the Bolivian military of 1967 follows. I felt that these chapters spent unnecessary pages on parts of the Bolivian military that had nothing to do with the campaign against Che’s Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army-ELN). I did appreciate the important role of the small Bolivian Air Force in tracking the ELN and providing mobility to the Bolivian Army Special Forces that fought the ELN. These Special Forces were trained by U.S. Army Green Berets in counter-insurgency tactics that paid off against the ELN. The specifics of the American training program and the Green Berets who led the program are named.

The meat of the work follows, describing in detail the guerilla campaign begun by Che in November 1966, going month by month, with excellent maps that track movements of both the ELN and the Bolivian Armed Forces, including the capture and execution of Che by the Bolivians (allegedly to the displeasure of the American CIA and military advisors to the Bolivians). As is typical of such books there are several pages with full-color plates of the planes and soldiers of the ELN and Bolivian Armed Forces.

The failure of Che’s guerilla campaign comes down to several factors: 1) Che had little knowledge of the local political realities of Bolivia and failed even to gain the full support of the Bolivian Communist Party. 2) The Bolivian government had addressed many of the political-economic demands of the Bolivian peasantry and working class that might have given the ELN a purchase to generate a real uprising of the Bolivian people. 3) The Bolivian Armed Forces were well-trained in counter-insurgency tactics by the U.S. Green Berets and made smart use of their Air Force against the ELN. 4) The foreign members of the ELN made many mistakes. Some were captured by the Bolivians and provided key intelligence to the Bolivian military on Che’s operations. 5) The ELN was much too small, having only 52 men and women total. A list of every member of the ELN (including the fate of each) and a very complete list of the important officers, enlisted men, and units of the Bolivian Armed Forces who fought the ELN are provided which would be useful for anyone desiring to conduct additional research into the campaign.

At the same time, despite its small size, the ELN killed 42 Bolivian soldiers and 7 civilians while losing 37 killed, with 15 individuals surviving past 1967. A short chapter rounds out the book with the post-Che campaigns of the ELN that continued into 1970. Moreover, the so-called ‘Curse of Che’ is recounted with the deaths of several of the individuals who had a role in the death of Che (in the opinion of some, the result of a deliberate assassination campaign by leftists who idolized Che). The legacy of the ELN in Bolivia is also considered, though Sapienza does not acknowledge how the myth of a heroically doomed revolution that Che Guevara led in Bolivia turned him into a martyr for the Worldwide Left and Liberation Movements, with the classic silhouette of Che in a military uniform and beret remaining an image the entire world can recognize, and which still graces many t-shirts. After all, few failed revolutionaries get to be played in Hollywood movies by the likes of Benicio Del Toro and Gael Garcia Bernal! Che’s diaries continue to be best sellers years after his death.

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Our Reviewer: Dr. Stavropoulos received his Ph.D. in History from the CUNY Graduate Center in 2013. Currently an Adjunct Professor at Kingsborough Community College, CUNY, his previous reviews include Prelude to Waterloo: Quatre Bras: The French Perspective, Braddock's Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution, Italy 1636: Cemetery of Armies, In the Name of Lykourgos, The Other Face of Battle, The Bulgarian Contract, Napoleon’s Stolen Army, In the Words of Wellington’s Fighting Cocks, Chasing the Great Retreat, Athens, City of Wisdom: A History, Commanding Petty Despots, Writing Battles: New Perspectives on Warfare and Memory in Medieval Europe, SOG Kontum, Simply Murder, Soldiers from Experience, July 22: The Civil War Battle of Atlanta, New York’s War of 1812, The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777, The Spear, the Scroll, and the Pebble, The Killing Ground, The Hill: The Brutal Fight for Hill 107 in the Battle of Crete, The Lion at Dawn: Forging British Strategy in the Age of the French Revolution, Stalin's Revenge: Operation Bagration and the Annihilation of Army Group Centre, The Farthest Valley, The Soldier's Reward, and The Traitor of Arnhem.

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